of a poet, a mathematician, etc. But educated people do not want a sign
and draw little distinction between the trade of a poet and that of an
embroiderer.

People of education are not called poets or mathematicians, etc.; but they
are all these and judges of all these. No one guesses what they are. When
they come into society, they talk on matters about which the rest are
talking. We do not observe in them one quality rather than another, save
when they have to make use of it. But then we remember it, for it is
characteristic of such persons that we do not say of them that they are fine
speakers, when it is not a question of oratory, and that we say of them that
they are fine speakers, when it is such a question.

It is therefore false praise to give a man when we say of him, on his entry,
that he is a very clever poet; and it is a bad sign when a man is not asked
to give his judgement on some verses.

35. We should not be able to say of a man, "He is a mathematician," or "a
preacher," or "eloquent"; but that he is "a gentleman." That universal
quality alone pleases me. It is a bad sign when, on seeing a person, you
remember his book. I would prefer you to see no quality till you meet it and
have occasion to use it (Ne quid minis),[3] for fear some one quality
prevail and designate the man. Let none think him a fine speaker, unless
oratory be in question, and then let them think it.

36. Man is full of wants: he loves only those who can satisfy them all.
"This one is a good mathematician," one will say. But I have nothing to do
with mathematics; he would take me for a proposition. "That one is a good
soldier." He would take me for a besieged town. I need, then, an upright man
who can accommodate himself generally to all my wants.

37. Since we cannot be universal and know all t